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Online media platforms have enabled users to connect with individuals, organizations, and share their thoughts. Other than
connectivity, these platforms also serve multiple purposes - education, promotion, updates, awareness, etc. Increasing the
reputation of individuals in online media (aka Social growth) is thus essential these days, particularly for business owners and
event managers who are looking to improve their publicity and sales. e natural way of gaining social growth is a tedious
task, which leads to the creation of unfair ways to boost the reputation of individuals articially. Several online blackmarket
services have developed thriving ecosystem with lucrative oers to aract content promoters for publicizing their content
online. ese services are operated in such a way that most of their inorganic activities are being unnoticed by the media
authorities, and the customers of the blackmarket services are less likely to be spoed. We refer to such unfair ways of
bolstering social reputation in online media as collusion. is survey is the rst aempt to provide readers a comprehensive
outline of the latest studies dealing with the identication and analysis of blackmarket-driven collusion in online media. We
present a broad overview of the problem, denitions of the related problems and concepts, the taxonomy of the proposed
approaches, description of the publicly available datasets and online tools, and discuss the outstanding issues. We believe that
collusive entity detection is a newly emerging topic in anomaly detection and cyber-security research in general and the
current survey will provide readers with an easy-to-access and comprehensive list of methods, tools and resources proposed
so far for detecting and analyzing collusive entities on online media.
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Collusion, blackmarket, Twier, YouTube, social media analysis
1 INTRODUCTION
e prosperity of online media has aracted people and organizations to join the platform and use it for several
purposes - creating a network among commonalities, building and broadening their business, promoting/demoting
e-commerce products, etc. is has led users to choose articial ways of gaining social growth to get benets
within a short time. e main reason behind choosing articial boosting is that the legitimate eorts of gaining
appraisals (followers, retweets, likes, shares, etc.) take a signicant amount of time and may not meet the actual
needs of users. Such activities impose a signicant threat to social media platforms as these are mostly against
the Terms of Service of many social media platforms (see Section 2.1.2 for more details). Such articial boosting
of social reputation/growth is oen known as “collusion” [28, 40].
According to a recent survey by HitSearch1, 98% of content creators admied to having spoed collusive
followers among online inuencers on Instagram. e adversarial impact of the collusive entities poses a massive
threat to online media. ese entities create an atmosphere where people start trusting their information due to
the popularity they receive. For example, in the 2019 UK general election, politicians approached the blackmarket
services2 for online political campaigning in order to reach out to their potential voters. A study conducted by
LawSuit3, a law management rm in the United States, reported that around 15% of the Twier users are non-
human accounts driving more than 66% links published to the site. It is also reported that most of the politicians
currently in contention or conversation for the 2020 US presidential election have a very high percentage or
volume of non-human followers linked to their Twier account. e above examples show how collusive entities
∗is is the corresponding author
1hps://tinyurl.com/y39qtg2r
2hps://www.ics-digital.com/general-election-2019-mps-fake-twier-followers/
3hps://lawsuit.org/politics-and-fake-social-media-followers/
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boost the believability of information during events. Moreover, the limitation of humans’ potential to distinguish
between the collusive and genuine entities due to the vast amount of available information is an important
concern that motivates to design methods for automatic identication of these entities. e collusive entities
not only deceive people but also pollute the entire social space. Using the blackmarket services, the collusive
entities can perform appraisals such as improving the credibility of rumors, propagate fake news, inate/deate
the ratings of products in e-commerce platforms, gain popularity in video-sharing platforms, etc. Fig. 1 illustrates
how collusive entities gain articial appraisals on various online media platforms. We request the reader to
refer to Section 4 for a thorough explanation of Fig. 1. Recent studies that tackle the problem of collusive entity
detection state that it is harder to discern these entities as they express a mixture of organic and inorganic
activities [40]. Moreover, the problem is relatively new as compared to its related studies, e.g., bot/spam detection,
fake account detection, etc. and recently has gained signicant aention from diverse research communities.
Although articial boosting has become a regular practice with the increasing popularity of dierent online
media platforms, there is a lack of coherent and collective aempts from dierent research communities to explore
the micro-dynamics controlling such malpractice and the extent of its eect in manipulating social reputation.
Most of the existing studies aim to detect spam [13, 30, 82, 85, 99, 113, 115, 116, 120–122, 131, 136], fake [20, 26,
31, 32, 43, 53, 54, 56, 65, 86, 97, 106, 137] and bots [21, 24, 25, 29, 30, 34, 38, 47, 51, 68, 70, 88, 114, 117, 130, 135],
and how these accounts are used for information propagation [12, 27, 36, 75, 78, 78, 91, 104, 119] in online media.
Studies [39, 40] have shown that collusive users are neither fake users nor bots, but are normal human beings who
express a mixture of organic and inorganic activities. Unlike bots, these users have no synchronicity across their
behaviors [40], which makes it dicult to design automated techniques to detect them. In this paper, we present
a comprehensive survey of existing literature on topics related to collusion in dierent online media platforms.
Recently, Kumar and Shah [74] surveyed three aspects of false information on the web and social media – fake
reviews, hoaxes, and false news. ey also mentioned about the lack of publicly available datasets related to
false information and social media rumors. In comparison to [74] and other related surveys, we mention our
contributions in the remaining part of this section.
1.1 Related Surveys and Our Contributions
To our knowledge, this is the rst survey to provide a detailed overview of collusive activities in online media.
e aim of this survey is to provide readers with a comprehensive overview of the major studies conducted in
detecting and reasoning collusive activities across dierent online media platforms. e following four aspects
make our survey unique and dierent from other related surveys:
(1) Existing surveys do not directly focus on the problem of “collusive activities” and are more centered
around the detection and analysis of fake users, fraudsters and spammers on the web. Previous studies
mentioned that unlike these problems, collusive activities are very dierent in nature [7, 39, 40] due to
the mixture of organic and inorganic activities. In this paper, we conduct a thorough analysis of past
studies dealing with collusive activities in dierent online platforms.
(2) Existing surveys mentioned only fraud and spam-related datasets. Here, we describe the datasets on
collusion from multiple aspects - the type of dataset and the entities present in them.
(3) We also outline the annotation guidelines and evaluation metrics used for collusive entity detection, as
mentioned in the related studies.
(4) We conclude the paper by highlighting a set of key challenges and open problems in the area of collusion
in online media.
We use the terms collusion and articial boosting of social growth interchangeably throughout the paper. We refer
to an action/appraisal as online media activity such as retweet, follow, review, view, subscription, etc., and an
entity as a social entity such as user, tweet, post, review, etc.
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Fig. 1. Illustration of blackmarket services with types, platforms, appraisals.
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1.2 Survey Methodology
1.2.1 Survey Scope. Since our scope is on investigating collusive entities in online media platforms, we will
systematize the studies related to the analysis and detection of the collusive entities. As collusion is related to a
few other aspects such as fake, bot, spam, etc., we partly focus on the previous works in those domains as well.
1.2.2 Survey Organization. In this article, we survey the existing algorithms, methodologies and applications in
detecting and analyzing collusive activities in online media platforms. In Section 2, we provide a broad overview
and background of collusion in online media. We also analyze particular cases of collusion, show how collusion
is closely related to other close concepts, see how collusion has been evolving and who are the main targets of it.
Next, in Section 3, we provide some preliminary concepts on blackmarket services. In Section 4, we show how
collusion happens across multiple online media platforms and overview the state-of-the-art techniques for each
platform. Section 5 explains two broad categories of collusive activities. To identify what has been done so far
in the literature, in Section 6, we conduct a systematic literature review of the existing techniques. In Section
7, we present the annotation guidelines, related datasets and evaluation metrics that can be used for studies in
collusive entity detection. Being a under-explored research problem, there are plenty of important issues that
need further aention. Pointers to such issues are mentioned in Section 8. Section 9 concludes this survey with a
summary of the main contributions and open problems.
2 BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Overview of Online Media
2.1.1 Online Media Platforms. Online media refers to the technologies present on the Internet that connect
people or organizations to exchange information. e reason online media has become famous is the abundant
sources of information oered by the Internet where a user can get access to the same news from several places.
To keep users engaged, online media platforms also enable them to share their opinions on the information. In
today’s world, social media is considered to be a fast, inexpensive and eective way to reach a target audience.
e history of online media started at the end of the 19th century with the arrival of Arpanet, email, blogging and
bulletin boards. Prior to this, services such as telegram, radio, telephone, etc. were used to exchange information.
However, their contributions were limited as information exchange in these platforms did not take place “online”
and was mostly used to send individual messages between two people. e rapid growth of the Internet in
early 2000 set the real stage for the emergence of online media with the arrival of knowledge sharing and
social networking sites. Fig. 2 depicts the history of online media starting from postal service in the early 90s
to live-streaming (Periscope, Meerkat) and messaging platforms (Discord) in 2020. Example of online media
platforms are social networking sites (e.g., Facebook, LinkedIn), microblogs (e.g., Twier, Tumblr), wiki-based
knowledge-sharing sites (e.g., Wikipedia), social news sites and websites of news media (e.g., Hungton Post),
forums, mailing lists, newsgroups community media sites (e.g., YouTube, Flickr, Instagram), social Q & A sites
(e.g., ora, Yahoo Answers), user reviews (e.g., Yelp, Amazon.com), social curation sites (e.g., Reddit, Pinterest)
and location-based social networks (e.g., Foursquare).
2.1.2 Terms of Service in Online Media Platforms. Terms of Service (ToS) in online media platforms refer
to the rules and regulations to be agreed upon by the users of the services. Each service has its own policy
against fake and spam engagements. For instance, Twier has declared its own platform manipulation and spam
policy4, YouTube has Fake Engagement Policy5, etc. ese policies ensure that violations of the rules may result
in permanent suspension of account and its content. e ToS followed by the online media platforms forbids
articially inating own or others’ appraisals (followers/retweets/views/likes/subscriptions). is includes selling
4hps://help.twier.com/en/rules-and-policies/platform-manipulation
5hps://support.google.com/youtube/answer/3399767?hl=en
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Fig. 2. Evolution of online media platforms.
or purchasing engagements using premium services, using or promoting third-party apps by posting content
that helps in gaining engagements, trading to exchange engagements using freemium services, etc. Some of the
terms proposed by Twier on collusion-related activities are engagement churn (rst following a large number of
unrelated Twier accounts and then unfollowing them), indiscriminate engagement (using third-party APIs or
automated soware to follow a large number of unrelated accounts in a short time period), aggressive engagement
(aggressively engaging with Tweets to drive trac or aention to accounts).
2.2 Collusion in online media
2.2.1 Definition. In general, collusion is dened as a covert and secret conspiracy or collaboration to deceive
others. Collusion in online media is a process by which users articially gain social reputation, which violates the
ToS of the online media platform. Online media entities involved in collusion approach blackmarket services
to articially inate their social status. is results in entities to appear credible and legitimate to the end-
users, thus leading to activities such as fake promotions, campaigns, misinformation, etc., thereby creating an
inadequate social space. e blackmarket services provide eminent online media services ranging from online
social networks to various other platforms such as rating/review platforms, video-sharing platforms and even
recruitment platforms. In Section 4, we discuss in detail how collusion happens in all these platforms. For
example, a boost in YouTube views can transform a small event into a big campaign or a promotional event.
Despite its apparent presence in the real world, collusion has remained as an underexplored concept. We go
deeper into the notion of collusion by discussing particular cases and examples in the next subsection.
2.2.2 Examples of Collusive Activities. In this section, we show two examples of how collusion happens in
online media. Fig. 3 shows an example of collusive activities in online media. Note that we redacted the name
of the Twier user/YouTube channel to maintain anonymity. Fig. 3(a) shows the ocial Twier account of
an organization registered in blackmarket services for collusive follower appraisals. Fig. 3(b) shows a video
posted by a veried YouTube channel registered in blackmarket services for collusive like requests. In both
examples, the accounts are marked as veried by Twier/YouTube. e presence of veried online media entities
in the blackmarket services clearly shows that the in-house algorithms deployed by these platforms have been
unsuccessful in detecting such entities. is further motivates the problem and necessitates the development of
automated techniques to detect these entities. In Section 4.1, we discuss in detail how online media users can
request verication badge through the blackmarket services.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 3. Example of collusive activities in online media. (a) an oicial Twier account of an organization registered in
blackmarket services for collusive follower appraisals. (b) a video posted by a verified YouTube channel registered in
blackmarket services for collusive like requests. Some profile information are blurred for the sake of anonymity.
2.3 Reasons behind Collusion
In order to keep up with the pace of today’s turbo-charged world, a large number of users like to go against
the stream. ough shortcuts to success always conict with the enormous eorts needed to be successful, it
may also lead to some costly mistakes, eventually undermining the true goals. Online media is considered as
the perfect convergence of communication and information. It has already become the most important source
for public information, organizations and for individuals to promote their ideologies, products and services.
Manipulating such an important source of information can result in a signicant gain in terms of fame and
nance for individuals/organizations. is is clearly evident in online social networking platforms like Twier in
the form of aaining fake followers, rating platforms like Amazon in the form of posting fake reviews, video
streaming platforms like YouTube in the form of synthetic gain in viewership count and many more. With a
huge competition in online media, it is hard for online media users who spend months creating new content but
fail to reach their target audience. Blackmarket services serve as a complete social media toolkit that helps an
online media entity to gain a stronger social media presence among its competitors. It is very eective for – (i)
companies who want to hype a campaign, (ii) musicians who want to promote new projects, album and releases,
(iii) entertainment companies who want to publicize their shows, and (iv) online media moguls who need quick
online media presence.
2.4 Challenges in Collusion Detection
Detecting collusive activities is a challenging task. Dua et al. [40] showed how collusive users show a mixed
behavior of organic and inorganic activities. In the case of Twier, these users, on the one hand, are involved in
retweeting (following) genuine tweets (genuine users); and on the other hand, they are involved in retweeting
(following) tweets (users) submied to the blackmarket services. is kind of mixed behavior makes it dicult
to be detected by traditional fake user detection methods [103]. Moreover, collusive users are not bots; they
are normal human beings. is makes it dicult to be agged by bot detection methods [28]. A recent study
by Dua et al. [42] investigated how collusion happens on YouTube. ey designed web scrapers to collect a
large set of YouTube videos and channels submied to the blackmarket services for collusive appraisals. In the
case of rating platforms like Amazon, methods to detect collusive reviewers have not been successful so far
due to the lack of enough labeled data. e dynamic nature of the propagation of collusive activities is very
complicated. Collusive activities can easily propagate and impact a large number of users in a short time by
spreading misinformation. Kim et al. [69] developed CURB, an online algorithm that leverages information from
the crowd to prevent the spread of misinformation. ey also reported that fact-checking organizations like
Snope and Politifact are not able to properly limit the spread of misinformation as it requires signicant
human eort. Moreover, as collusion happens in multiple online media platforms, it is also a dicult task to
understand the complete adversarial intent of the collusive entities. is raises concern on developing systems
6
Table 1. Comparison between collusion and other related concepts.
Concept Denition of the concept Dierence from collusion
Fake Fake is to increase the visibility of others’
content [41].
Collusion is self-focused i.e., to increase the
visibility of their own content.
Bot Bots have synchronous fraudulent activi-
ties [49].
Collusive entities exhibit asynchronous
fraudulent activities.
Sockpuppetry Sockpuppets are operated by a puppetmas-
ter who controls other user accounts [71].
In collusion, every account is controlled by
the real owner of the account.
Malicious promotion Promote a specic product/topic for a tar-
get audience [81].
Collusion is more general and not neces-
sarily focused on a specic product/topic.
Spam Consistently perform similar operations
across multiple accounts to manipulate or
undermine current trends [48].
Collusive entity may contain spammy con-
tents, but not necessarily.
Content polluters Polluters post nearly identical contents,
sometimes by randomly adding mentions
to unrelated legitimate users [77].
In collusion, content pollution never oc-
curs as every action happens through the
blackmarket services.
Relationship Inltrators ey follow the reciprocity in the relation-
ship (follow/retweet/subscribe) to engage
in spam activities [77].
In collusion, reciprocity happens in
freemium services to gain credits.
Slanderous users ey give a false low rating with a positive
review to confuse recommender systems
[129]
Collusive users always give a high rating
and positive review.
for early detection of collusive entities to limit its articial social growth. Finally, due to the restrictions of the
online media platforms on collecting the public data, the research community has very limited training data,
which does not include all the necessary information of collusive entities. Most of the previous studies [7, 42]
had to design their own scrapers due to the limitations and restrictions of the APIs provided by the online media
platforms.
2.5 Collusion and Other Related Concepts
Some related concepts to collusion are fake, bot, sockpuppetry, malicious promotion, spam, content polluters,
relationship inltrators and slanderous users. We distinguish between these concepts and collusion in Table
1. Even though these concepts dier from collusion, they are highly related. erefore, studying the literature
which focuses on these topics will give us a beer knowledge of how to analyze and detect the collusive entities
in online media platforms.
3 A NOTE ON BLACKMARKET SERVICES
Blackmarket services are the major controlling authorities of collusive activities. Customers join these services
and contribute directly or indirectly to boost their online proles articially. e blackmarket services are divided
into two types based on the mode of service [103] – Premium and Freemium.
1. Premium Services: ese services require the customers to pay a certain amount of money in order to obtain
the facilities (e.g., SocialShop, RedSocial). Most of the premium services provide a comprehensive range of social
media enhancement services for all purposes. ese services also ensure strategic social media promotion to
maintain an edge over the competitors, in the following ways: (i) location-specic actions, (ii) time during which
users want to gain social growth, (iii) users gained from the services have eye-catching display pictures and lled
7
Fig. 4. Illustration showing the working principle of premium and freemium services.
out bios in the prole, and (iv) domain-specic actions (users gained from services can be from various domains
such as fashion, music, blogging, etc.). ese services oer actions in tiers (100, 1K, 10K, etc.) and lucrative
oers to their customers and some additional facilities such as 100% money-back guarantee, retention guarantee,
complete privacy, etc. Few of these services ensure replenishment if the customer experiences any drop in the
actions. We divide this type of services into two categories:
(1) General Premium: Here, customers have to choose a plan which suits their budget.
(2) Auto Premium: ese services provide daily/weekly/monthly delivery service of actions. Customers
need to select one of the auto action packages in advance for a time duration, e.g., 100 Twier auto
retweets (2-4 days). e main advantage of these services is to automate the process of social reputation
to an extent. e basic principle of auto premium remains the same as that of general premium services
but can be considered as a faster and eective way to boost social reputation.
2. Freemium Services: ese services are free to use; but they also have premium subscription plans (e.g.,
YouLikeHits, Like4Like). e main idea is to get customers familiar with the workow of the services and motivate
them to opt for the premium plans. Freemium services operate in one of the three ways: social-share services,
auto-time freemium services, and credit-based services. More details on these types can be found in [40] and [39].
Freemium services operate in one of the three ways [40]:
(1) Social-share Services: ese services require customers to perform social actions on multiple platforms
in order to get appraisals for their content. Some of the possible actions are share/like/follow on Facebook,
follow/like/view/comment on Instagram, like/view/share on YouTube, etc.
(2) Auto-time Freemium services: ese services require the customers to get access tokens from the
services, aer which they can request for a xed number of actions for a time duration, e.g., 10-50 retweets
in 10 minutes window.
(3) Credit-based Services: ese services are operated based on a ‘give and take’ relationship. Customers
of these services lose credits when other customers perform actions on their submied content. Similarly,
customers gain credits when they perform actions on the content of other customers.
Fig. 4(a) shows the working of premium services. Here, two types of entities are involved – customers that ask
for appraisals and suppliers those supply appraisals. Fig. 4(b) shows the working of freemium services. Here,
customers are involved in a credit-based ecosystem; hence customers are also the suppliers. e wordclouds of the
description/bios or premium and freemium users observed by Dua and Chakraborty [39] are shown in Fig. 5.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 5. Wordclouds generated from the profile description of customers in (a) premium and (b) freemium services. Reprinted
with permission from [39].
4 COMPROMISED ONLINE PLATFORMS
As discussed in previous sections, collusion happens across multiple online media platforms. In this section,
we discuss in detail how appraisals in these platforms are articially manipulated by the collusive entities.
We will look into seven types of platforms: Social networks, rating/review platforms, video streaming platforms,
recruitment platforms, discussion platforms, music sharing platforms and development platforms. Other than
the above-mentioned platforms, we will also look into the articial manipulation of website trac through
blackmarket services. Fig. 1 illustrates how dierent types of blackmarket services provide collusive appraisals to
various online media platforms.
4.1 Social Networks
Social networks serve as a platform to build social relations among users of common interests (personal or
professional). Platforms like Twier, Facebook and Instagram allow their users to perform actions such as post,
like, retweet, follow, share, etc. Nowadays, these platforms also serve as real-time news delivery services and a
medium for the business owners to connect with their customers and thus expand their outreach. However, the
natural way to aract users is usually a tedious task and takes signicant time. is motivates users to choose an
articial way of gaining appraisals.
Facebook. Facebook is the most popular social network to connect and share with family and friends online.
Facebook has four types of appraisals: shares, likes, comments, followers. Large number of appraisals on Facebook
acts as a form of social proof for the sign of popularity and importance.
Twier. Twier is a microblogging service where users write tweets about topics such as politics, sport, cooking,
fashion, etc. Twier has three types of appraisals: retweets, likes and followers. Acquiring more appraisals on
Twier helps to increase the user’s social signals and aract more visitors to the prole.
Instagram. Instagram is a social networking platform that enables users to share images or videos with their
audience. Users can upload photos, videos and share them with their followers or with a group of friends.
Instagram has three types of appraisals: likes, followers and views. Higher appraisals are the key to visibility on
Instagram. e more appraisals a post receives on Instagram, the higher is the post rank in search results and on
the Explore page.
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Pinterest.: Pinterest is an image-sharing platform that is designed as a visual discovery engine for nding ideas
like recipes, home and style inspiration, etc. A message on Pinterest is known as Pin. Pinterest has two types of
appraisals: likes and followers.
Other than the common appraisals, we found few blackmarket services where social networking users can
request for a verication badge. Verifiedbadge6, StaticKing7, Prime badges8 and SocialKing9 are the most
popular platforms providing such appraisals. Verication badges are coveted checkmark badges that enhance the
user’s social media presence and improve credibility on the platform. e minimum requirements to request for
verication badges through blackmarket services are as follows:
• e user/organization should be a celebrity, journalist, popular brand, government ocial or sports
company.
• e user/organization should have a Wikipedia page or media coverage in leading online news portals.
• For social media platforms where subscription is an appraisal, the user should have a minimum of 100K
subscribers.
ere is a vast literature on the detection and analysis of collusive entities in social networks. Shah et al.
[103] and Dua et al. [40] are two of the rst few studies that investigate collusive entities on Twier registered
in blackmarket services. Dua et al. [40] trained multiple state-of-the-art supervised classiers using a set of
64 features to distinguish collusive users from genuine users. ey also divided the set of collusive users into
three categories: bots, promotional customers and normal customers. Arora et al. [7] obtained beer classication
performance than Dua et al. [40] by incorporating the content-level and network-level properties of Twier
users in a multi-task seing. De Cristofaro et al. [35] performed the rst work on Facebook where the authors
presented a comparative measurement study of page promotion methods. Sen et al. [100] conducted the rst
work on Instagram where they developed an automated mechanism to detect fake likes on Instagram. We discuss
in detail about these studies in Section 6.
4.2 Rating/Review Platforms
Rating/Review platforms allow users to rate or share their opinion about entities, e.g., products, applications,
food items, restaurants, movies, etc. Examples of these platforms are e-commerce platforms (e.g., Amazon), travel
platforms (e.g., TripAdvisor), business rating platforms (e.g., Yelp, Google review), etc.
Amazon. Amazon is the world’s largest e-commerce platform and is considered the ultimate hub for selling
merchandise on the web. It allows two types of appraisals: reviews and ratings. High ratings and reviews for a
product on Amazon aract customers and make the product more trustworthy.
Google. Google provides valuable information to businesses and its customers using two types of appraisals:
reviews and ratings. Higher ratings and reviews on Google help to improve the business and enhance local search
rankings.
TripAdvisor. TripAdvisor is an online travel platform that oers multiple services such as online hotel reser-
vations, travel experiences, restaurant reviews, etc. Similar to other platforms, TripAdvisor has two types of
appraisals: reviews and ratings. Positive reviews from previous occupants help the business to improve its
reputation and increase the customer base.
Yelp. Yelp is a local business review platform that collects crowdsourced data from its users. Yelp has two types
of appraisals: reviews and ratings. Geing more reviews in turn improves business reputation and gets a lot more
customers with free trac.
6hps://veriedbadge.co/
7hps://www.staticking.com/
8hps://primebadges.com/
9hps://www.socialking.in/
10
Nowadays, online reviews/ratings are becoming highly relevant for customers to take any purchase-related
decisions. As these appraisals play a signicant role in deciding the sentiment/popularity of a product/business,
there is a massive scope for collusion among sellers/buyers to manipulate it articially. [66, 79, 123] are a
few initial studies on detecting fake reviews in review paerns representing unusual behaviors of reviewers.
Another early work by Li et al. [80] identied fake reviews on Dianping, the largest Chinese review hosting site.
e authors proposed a supervised learning algorithm to identify fake reviews in a heterogeneous network of
users, reviews and IP addresses. Mukherjee et al. [90] performed one of the rst aempts to detect fraudulent
reviewer groups in e-commerce platforms. Recently, Kumar et al. [73] identied users in rating platforms who
give fraudulent ratings for excessive monetary gains. Most of the studies in review platforms are focused on
e-commerce platforms. We believe the newer platforms such as Google reviews, Yelp and TripAdvisor would
open more research questions as these platforms contain reviews of millions of hotels, restaurants, aractions
and other tourist-related businesses.
4.3 Video Streaming Platforms
Video streaming platforms are mostly used for sharing videos and streaming live videos. ese platforms allow
users to upload, view, rate, share, add to playlists, report, comment on videos and subscribe to other users.
Here, we discuss how appraisals on video streaming platforms are inated articially. With the increase in the
popularity of live streaming came the concept of “astroturng” – a broader and sophisticated term referring to the
synthetic increase of appraisals in an online social network by means of blackmarket services. e consequences
of such synthetic ination are not only restricted to increase monetary benets, directory listings and partnership
benets, but also expanded to beer recommendation rankings thus doctoring the experiences of viewers who
are recommended all these boosted materials instead of genuine materials produced by the honest broadcasters.
YouTube. YouTube is a video sharing platform where users can create their own prole, upload videos, watch,
like and comment on other videos. YouTube has four types of appraisals: likes, comments, subscribers, views. Likes,
comments and views are for the videos and subscribers are for the channels. Higher the number of YouTube
users interacts with a video/channel, higher that video/channel will be listed to other users. ese appraisals are
considered as the measure of engagement and not only make the entity popular but also help the channel with
sponsorship opportunities and monetization options.
Twitch. Twitch is the most popular live streaming platform on the web. It is mostly used by gamers to stream
their games while other users can watch them. Twitch has two types of appraisals: followers and views. e
higher views a channel has, the higher is its popularity on Twitch and to be ranked on the featured list. Twitch is
usually considered to be one of the most dicult platforms to earn quick popularity due to the presence of so
many streamers using the platform.
Tiktok. Tiktok is a video sharing social network which is primarily used to create short videos of 3 to 15
seconds. Tiktok has two types of appraisals: likes and followers. Geing more likes on Tiktok posts increases the
chance to maintain its presence and make it famous amongst the audience.
Vimeo. Vimeo is a video hosting and sharing platform that allows users to upload and promote their videos
with a high degree of customization which is not available on other competing platforms. Vimeo has two types
of appraisals: likes and followers. A higher number of appraisals helps to show up the video in the suggested
videos list created by Vimeo’s algorithm.
Few studies addressed issues of astroturng in video streaming platforms. Shah [101] made the pioneering
aempt to combat astroturng on live-streaming platforms. He proposed Flock, an unsupervised method to
identify boed broadcasts and their constituent boed views. Note that he didn’t disclose the name of the live
streaming corporation on which the study was performed. In a recent study, Dua et al. [42] proposed CollATe,
an unsupervised method to detect collusive entities on YouTube. e method utilizes the metadata features,
temporal features and textual features of a video to detect whether it is collusive or not.
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4.4 Recruitment Platforms
Recruitment platforms are employment-oriented platforms that also provide professional networking among
users. ese platforms oer the opportunity to discover new professionals either locally or internationally
and help one with their professional endeavors. Hiring new employees is a crucial part of every organization,
which starts with posting new job ads and ends with recruitment. It can be thought of as a multi-step process,
which is normally very time-consuming and prone to human errors. With the advent and rise of automated
systems, the hiring process of an organization is being done in the cloud with the help of tools such as Applicant-
Tracking-System (ATS)10. ATS makes the hiring process faster and accurate by preparing job ads, posting them
online, collecting applicant resumes, making ecient communication with them and nding the best t resumes
for the organization. However, increasing use of ATS also invokes various disadvantages such as spammers
compromising the job seekers’ privacy, slandering the reputation of the organizations and nancially hurting it
by manipulating the normal ow of functioning of the system - most frequently the job ads publishing process
(oen recognized as the employment scam).
LinkedIn. LinkedIn is the most popular online recruitment platform where employers can post jobs, and
job seekers can post their proles. ere are four types of appraisals on LinkedIn: followers, recommendations,
endorsements, and connections. A higher number of connections and followers on LinkedIn helps the user to gain
aention. LinkedIn endorsements help to add validity to the user’s prole by backing up his/her work experience.
Adikari and Dua [1] identied fake proles on LinkedIn. e authors considered state-of-the-art supervised
classiers designed on a set of prole-based features to detect fake proles. Prieto et al. [92] detected spammers
on LinkedIn based on a set of heuristics and their combinations using a supervised classier. Another work
by Vidros et al. [118] tackled the problem of Online Recruitment Frauds (ORF) (see Sec. 6 for more details).
e authors also released a publicly available dataset of 17, 880 annotated job ads (17, 014 legitimate and 866
fraudulent job ads) from various recruitment platforms.
4.5 Discussion Platforms
Discussion platforms are content sharing platforms primarily used to entertain community-based discussions.
e discussions can be in the form of question-and-answers or content that other users have submied using
links, text posts or images. Here, we explain how collusion happens on discussion platforms:
ora. ora is a question-and-answer based discussion forum that empowers the user to ask questions on
any subject and connect with like-minded people who contribute unique insights and high-quality answers.
ora has four types of appraisals: followers, upvotes, downvotes and comments. Higher the number of followers
and upvotes a user gains for his/her answers, higher is the ranking factor and the more the answers are displayed
to other users. e aim of a user on ora is to be named as a top writer in the long run. Answers wrien by top
writers on ora are considered as expert opinions and are also displayed in the featured list.
ASKfm. ASKfm is another question-and-answers based discussion forum and is mostly used by users to post
questions anonymously. e platform has two types of appraisals: followers and likes. Higher likes on answers
grow its rating on ASKfm at a faster rate.
Reddit. Reddit is a social news-based discussion forum that allows users to discuss and vote on content that
other users have submied. Reddit has ve types of appraisals: subscribers, upvotes, downvotes, karma and
comments. Having more karma on Reddit allows the user to post more oen on the platform and gives him/her
more reputation. More number of upvotes on posts helps users gain more exposure, which eventually pushes the
posts higher up on the targeted Reddit or Subreddit.
Studies in discussion platforms have been conducted with the goal of manipulating the visibility of political
threads on Reddit [22]. e authors measured the eect of manipulation of upvotes and downvotes on article
10hps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Applicant tracking system
12
visibility and user engagement by comparing Reddit threads whose visibility is articially increased. Another
work by Shen and Rose [105] investigated polarized user responses on an update to Reddit’s quarantine policy.
4.6 Music Sharing Platforms
Music sharing platforms enable users to upload, promote and share audio. Here, we explain how collusion
happens on music sharing platforms.
Soundcloud. Soundcloud is an audio sharing platform that connects the community of music creators, listeners
and curators. Soundcloud has three types of appraisals: plays, followers and likes. A higher number of followers
and likes creates a massive fan base for creators and gets more aention from the community. e popularity of
a soundtrack in the platform is driven by the number of plays it receives. Plays aract users to hear the music as
they feel to check something which is liked by most of the other users.
Reverbnation. Reverbnation is an independent music sharing platform where musicians, producers and venues
collaborate with each other. e platform has two types of appraisals: plays and fans. Higher the number of plays
in an audio or video, higher is the rank of the artist on the platform.
Some studies have been conducted on fraudulent entity detection in music sharing platforms. Bruns et al. [19]
investigated Twier bots that help in promoting SoundCloud tracks. e authors also proposed a number of
social media metrics that help to identify bot-like behavior in the sharing of such content. Another work by [96]
proposed a method to distinguish between two groups of SoundCloud accounts – bots and humans.
4.7 Development Platforms
Interestingly, we found a few popular development platforms where collusion happens.
GitHub. GitHub is a repository hosting service that provides distributed version control and source code
management (SCM) functionality. GitHub has three types of appraisals: followers, stars and forks. User proles
with more followers make the account more popular. Similarly, stars and forks are the metrics to show the
popularity of a repository. Blackmarket services help to deliver GitHub followers, stars and forks from real and
active people.
Hackernews. Hackernews is the most popular discussion platform for developers. It has three types of appraisals:
upvotes, karma and comments. Higher the number of comments and upvotes on a post, higher is its popularity. User
proles with high karma can perform additional appraisals on a post: downvote, making polls etc. Blackmarket
services help to deliver upvotes and karma on Hackernews simply by adding the post link and making the
payment.
Medium. Medium is an online publishing platform that is commonly used by developers to share ideas,
knowledge and perspectives. It has two types of appraisals: followers and claps. A higher number of claps in
a post ranks it higher in feed and search results. Similarly, a higher number of followers increases the post’s
reach and view. Blackmarket services help to deliver followers and claps by adding the post link and making the
payment.
Most of the studies in development platforms are on measuring user inuence and identifying unusual commit
behavior by analyzing the aributes of the platforms. Hu et al. [59] measured the user inuence on GitHub
using the network structure of the following relation, star relation, fork relation and user activities. e authors
also introduced an author-level H-index (also known as H-factor) to measure users’ capability. Goyal et al. [52]
identied the unusual changes in the commit history of GitHub repositories. e authors designed an anomaly
detection model based on commit characteristics of a repository. One potential research direction is to examine
how collusive appraisals on these platforms help to popularize the reputation of the repositories/users. Another
potential research direction is to develop collusive entity detection techniques by considering the hidden relations
between the entities of the platform.
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4.8 Other Platforms
Other than the online media, articial boosting is also observed in other platforms. Website owners can avail
premium/freemium blackmarket services to get trac on their website. e idea is to endow the responsibility
for the necessary amount of web trac to some other company. In blackmarket terms, the appraisal is called
as “hits” or “web trac”. Gaining articial hits helps the website to gain popularity faster compared to the slow
process of working on growing organic visitors via Search Engine Optimization. Blackmarket services oer two
types of web trac: Regional trac where the customers can opt for trac from a specic country or region
and Niche trac where customers can opt for targeted trac that focuses on a specic type of business such
as music-based, e-commerce based, etc. To activate trac to a website, customers have to enter the URL of the
website, the number of visitors required and preferred timespan for delivery.
5 TYPES OF COLLUSIVE ACTIVITIES
Collusive activities can be categorized based on the mode of collaboration - individual collusion and group collusion.
In this section, we will discuss the two types of collusion and how the individual collusion diers from group
collusion when providing collusive appraisals.
5.1 Individual Collusion
Individual collusion happens when the collusive activities of individuals are independent of each other; however,
they are guided by centralized blackmarket authorities. Understanding individual collusion has been studied to
some extent in the literature. Most of the existing studies used supervised models based on behavioral features
and prole features [40]. Some network-based approaches infer anomaly scores for nodes/edges in the network
(tweet-user network, product-user network, etc.) and rank them to spot suspicious users [28, 58, 73, 102, 123].
Existing studies mostly focused on the behavioral dynamics of individuals. However, these approaches fail when
it comes to detecting group collusion. Group collusion can be more damaging as they can take the total control
of the appraisals for an entity due to its size.
5.2 Group Collusion
Group-level collusion takes place when a set of individuals collaborate as a group to perform collusive activities.
Such collective behavior is, therefore, more subtle than individual behavior. At an individual level, activities might
be normal; however, at the group level, they might be substantially dierent from the normal behavior. Moreover,
it may not be possible to understand the actual dynamics of a group by aggregating the behavior of its members
due to the complicated, multi-faceted and evolving nature of inter-personal dynamics [37]. Some properties of
collusive groups are as follows – (i) members in collusive group work in shorter time frames and create maximum
impact (e.g., ooding deceptive opinions), (ii) members of the group may or may not know each other (agreement
by a contracting agency), (iii) multiple accounts within a group can be controlled by a single master account
(existence of Sockpuppets [72]), (iv) larger the size of the group, the more damaging the group is, and (v) group
members have a high chance of performing similar activities (group members posting similar reviews or writing
same comments). Past studies in this direction mostly detected groups using Frequent Itemset Mining (FIM) and
ranked groups based on dierent group-level spam indicators [55, 124]. Wang et al. [125] pointed out several
limitations of FIM for group detection – high computational complexity at low minimum support, absence of
temporal information, unable to capture overlapping groups, prone to detect small and tighter groups, etc. Liu
et al. [83] proposed HoloScope to nd a group of suspicious users in rating platforms based on the contrasting
behavior of fraudsters and honest users in terms of topology, temporal spikes and rating deviation.
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6 PROGRESS IN COLLUSIVE ENTITY DETECTION
Despite the increasing interest in analyzing and designing anomalous activities on the web, there has been limited
work in collusive entity detection. Most of the previous studies in collusive entity detection are limited to social
networks and rating platforms. In this section, we provide a summary of the reviewed papers to summarize the
central idea and provide the basics of the models. To structure the descriptions, the relevant papers are grouped
by the type of approaches proposed in the paper. We categorize the methodologies followed by the previous
studies into one of the following types: (i) feature based, (ii) graph based, and (iii) deep learning based.
6.1 Feature Based Detection
e majority of the papers model the behavioral properties of the users in online media platforms. Feature-based
methods can be used to distinguish between collusive entities from genuine entities. e aim is to design a
set of features that can (well) represent and capture various behavioral characteristics of the entities. Recently,
researchers have also focused on the linguistic behavior of the collusive entities, such as deceptive information
[6, 50], lexical analysis [61] and sentiment analysis [38].
Dua et al. [40] reported that collusive users show an amalgamation of organic and inorganic activities and there
is no synchronicity among their behaviors. ey substantiated their nding by comparing collusive retweeting
behavior with that of normal retweet fraudsters. Here, normal retweet fraudsters are those retweeters who are
abnormally synchronized in some paerns. e authors then collected data from four freemium blackmarket
services (credit-based services). ree human annotators were asked to label the blackmarket customers into bots,
promotional customers and normal customers based on a set of annotation rules. e data is used to tackle two
problems - (i) a four-class classication problem (genuine, bot, promotional, normal), and (ii) a binary classication
problem (genuine and combining all types of customers into a single class). In order to detect collusive retweeters,
the authors developed ScoRe, a supervised model to detect collusive retweeters based on ve sets of features:
prole features, social network features, user activity features, likelihood features and uctuation features. e
authors also developed a chrome browser extension to detect the collusive retweeters in real-time. To study
the underlying behavior of the blackmarket services, Dua and Chakraborty [39] extended their previous work
[40] to provide an in-depth analysis of collusive users involved in premium and freemium blackmarket services.
e authors collected the dataset from four premium and four freemium blackmarket services. ey analyzed
the activities of collusive users based on retweet-centric, network-centric, prole-centric and timeline-centric
properties. ey showed that unlike premium services, the credit-system in freemium services is the primary
reason behind the unusual functioning of freemium collusive users. ey also developed an updated version
of the chrome extension by incorporating the features calculated from both premium and freemium users. Fig.
5 shows the wordcloud of the text present in the description of premium and freemium retweeters collected
from the blackmarket services. It can be seen that premium retweeters are associated with high prole accounts
having keywords such as ‘CEO’, ‘ocial’, ‘speaker’, ‘founder’. However, freemium retweeters are associated with
advertising agencies having keywords such as ‘like’, ‘agency’, ‘SocialMedia’ and ‘YouTubeMarketing’.
Dua et al. [41] proposed HawkesEye, a classier based on the Hawkes process and topic modeling to detect
collusive retweeters on Twier. ey collected tweets using three hashtags: #deletefacebook, #cambridgeanalytica,
#facebookdataleaks and manually annotated the retweeters as “fake” or “genuine”. e HawkesEye model takes
the temporal information of retweet objects of a user and topical information of the retweet texts as input. e
temporal information is modeled using the Hawkes process due to its self-excitation property, and the topical
information is modeled using Latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA). e authors reported highly accurate results on
the classication task. Comparisons were made with respect to well-known bot detection approaches [24] and
collusive retweeter detection approaches [40].
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More recently, Arora et al. [7] improved the collusive retweeter detection task by considering the multifaceted
characteristics of a collusive user. ey created multiple views for a user by examining representations from
the content, aributes and social network. ey then proposed a multiview learning-based approach based on
Weighted Generalized Canonical Correlation Analysis (WGCCA) to combine individual representations (views)
of a user to derive the nal user embeddings. e authors reported that as each view is more and less helpful for
the classication experiment (c.f. t-SNE visualizations in g. 6), they assigned a weight to each view dierently
instead of treating each view equally.
Several research studies have been conducted about the automatic detection of collusive followers on Twier.
In an earlier study, Liu et al. [84] proposed DetectVC to detect voluntary followers (volowers). ey showed how
volowers gain prot by following enough users for self and product promotion. However, do these users act as a
group to perform malicious activities? To answer this, Gupta et al. [55] proposed approaches to detect malicious
retweeter groups. ey found that the activities appear normal at the individual level. However, at the group level,
they look suspicious and group activities vary across groups. Jang et al. [63] is the rst work that detects collusive
followers using geographical distance. e authors reported that when the distance between the legitimate users
and collusive users increases, the legitimate users’ follower ratio between the number of followers and the total
number of followers decreases. Aggarwal et al. [2] detected users on Twier with manipulated follower count
using an unsupervised local neighborhood detection method.
Other studies have looked at how collusion happens on Facebook and e-commerce platforms. De Cristofaro
et al. [35] conducted an in-depth analysis of Facebook pages where they collected likes via Facebook ads and other
farms. e authors monitored the “liking” activity by creating honeypot pages and crawling them aer every 2
hours to check for new likes from the blackmarket services. Badri Satya et al. [11] conducted an in-depth analysis
of fake likers on Facebook collected from the blackmarket services. ey reported that fake likers behave very
dierently than genuine likers in terms of their liking behaviors, longevity, etc. Mukherjee et al. [90] proposed
an unsupervised approach to detect and rank collusive spammer groups in Amazon. ey used Frequent Itemset
Mining (FIM) to extract the set of reviewer groups. e extracted reviewer groups were labeled by the domain
experts into spammer and genuine groups. eir proposed method GSRank considers various group-level spam
behavioral indicators, individual spam behavioral indicators and then models the inter-relationship between
reviewer groups, members of those reviewer groups and products they reviewed to nd the spammer groups.
Studies have also looked at articial manipulation of viewership/comment/subscription count in the video
streaming platforms such as YouTube, Twitch, etc. Shah [101] introduced FLOCK, an unsupervised multi-step
process for identifying boed views and boed broadcasts. FLOCK performs the following steps: (a) it models
a normal broadcast as a collection of multiple views; (b) it classies whether a given broadcast has inated
popularity by looking at the collective behavior of all the views in a broadcast; (c) it classies whether individual
views of the broadcast are boed. For modeling the normal broadcast behavior, the authors included temporal
features of the constituent views of broadcast, such as start time and end time of a particular view. It is also worth
noting that they avoided using descriptive features (like browser used, country of origin) and engagement-based
features to make the proposed solution easier. In a very recent study, Dua et al. [42] proposed three models to
detect three types of collusive entities on YouTube: (a) videos submied for collusive like requests, (b) videos
submied for collusive comment requests, and (c) channels submied for collusive subscription requests. ey
analyzed the videos submied to blackmarket services for collusive appraisals (likes and comments) based on two
perspectives – propagation dynamics and video metadata. ey also analyzed the collusive YouTube channels
based on location, channel metadata, and network properties. eir analysis on the structural properties of the
giant component present in the collusive channel network shows that it is a small-world. In order to detect the
collusive videos and collusive channels, they designed one-class classiers based on features calculated from
video metadata and temporal information. e models were evaluated in terms of true positive rate, achieving
state-of-the-art results. e authors also proposed CollATe, a denoising autoencoder model that leverages the
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Fig. 6. t-SNE visualization of representations of collusive (red) and genuine (green) users created using (a) Tweet2Vec, (b)
SCoRe[40], (c) Retweet network, (d) ote network, (e) Follower network, (f) Followee network. Reprinted with permission
from Arora et al. [7].
power of three components: metadata feature extractor, anomaly feature extractor and comment feature extractor
to learn feature representation of videos. Note that CollATe can only detect videos submied in blackmarket
services for collusive comment requests as unlike temporal information of like activity, the temporal information
of the comments is publicly available in the YouTube API11. Fig. 7 shows the snapshot of collusive entities
detected using their model. Fig. 7(a) shows a video where the number of likes is much higher than the number of
views. e authors claimed that the blackmarket services use YouTube API using the credentials of its users to
help these videos gain likes. Similarly, Fig. 7(c) shows the snapshot of a video submied to blackmarket services
for collusive comment subscriptions with a higher number of comments as compared to views and likes. Fig.
7(b) shows a YouTube channel that was submied for collusive subscriptions. e authors claimed that collusive
YouTube channels make proper use of promotional keywords to aract more subscribers to their channel.
e work by Vidros et al. [118] is the only work that deals with recruitment based fraud detection. e authors
introduced this problem as Online Recruitment Fraud (ORF), more specically relating to employment scams.
e dataset used in this work contains numerous job ads and their corresponding annotations (legitimate or
fraudulent). ey performed an in-depth analysis of the dataset by applying standard state-of-the-art machine
learning classiers. In these cases, the trapped user(s) unknowingly become a medium for scammers to complete
their jobs, oen even driving the individual to complete a direct wire transfer for them under the careful and
believable disguise of working visa or travel expenses. With this much being said about employment scams, it is
worth noting that although they share some similar characteristics with problems such as email phishing, online
opinion fraud, trolling, cyber-bullying, they are very much dierent in many aspects.
11hps://developers.google.com/youtube/v3
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(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 7. Example of (a) collusive video (for likes), (b) collusive channel (for subscriptions), and (c) collusive video (for comments)
detected by our models. Sensitive information are blurred. Reprinted with permission from [42].
Limitation. e main limitation is that in cases where user features are used, it can be restrictive to a particular
online media platform and not generalize to others. Moreover, if collusive activities are performed by new online
media accounts, it is dicult to collect user behaviors for such accounts. e drawback of using linguistic features
is the lack of generalizability across multiple languages and circumstances. It has been reported in the literature
[5, 76] that linguistic features designed for one circumstance may not work perfectly for other circumstances.
6.2 Graph Based Models
In this section, we present and discuss the graph-based models for collusive entity detection. Recently, graph-
based models have been developed particularly for spoing outliers and anomalies in networks. e advantage of
using graph techniques is to eciently capture long-range correlations among the inter-dependent data objects
[4].
Chetan et al. [28] proposed CoReRank, an unsupervised approach to capture the interdependency between
the credibility of users and the merit of tweets using a recurrence formulation based on network, behavioral
information of users and topical diversity of tweets. e authors created a directed bipartite graph by modeling the
interactions between users and tweets in terms of retweets/quotes. ey nally reported suspiciousness scores for
both users and tweets in the graph based on the recurrent formulation. By incorporating prior knowledge about
the collusive users, they proposed a semi-supervised version of CoReRank, called CoReRank+. Both CoReRank and
CoReRank+ outperformed their respective state-of-the-art methods by a signicant margin.
Rayana and Akoglu [94] proposed SpEagle, a framework that considers metadata of reviews (review content,
rating, timestamp) along with relational data (reviewer-review-product graph) for detecting spam users, fake
reviews and the products targeted by spammers. SpEagle used metadata for extracting the spam features, which
were then transformed into a spam score to decide the genuineness of users and reviews. It was also extended to
a semi-supervised seing (called SpEagle+) to improve its performance. e authors also implemented a lighter
version (SpLite) that leverages a small subset of review features for the detection task to achieve a boost in
runtime. Wang et al. [125] proposed a bipartite graph projection-based approach, called GSBP to detect review
spammer groups in e-commerce websites. Unlike FIM based methods [90], their proposed approach detects
loosely connected spammer groups – each group member may not review every target product of the group.
Kumar et al. [73] developed a fraudulent reviewer detection system, called REV2 for rating platforms. ey
proposed three interdependent metrics – fairness of a user in rating an item, reliability of a specic rating, and
goodness of a product. By combining network and behavioral properties of users, products and ratings, REV2
calculates fairness, reliability, goodness scores in both supervised and unsupervised seings. ey evaluated the
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(a) (b)
Fig. 8. (a) Schematic diagram of DeFrauder to detect online fraud reviewer groups. (b) Coherent review paerns of four
spammers in a fraudulent reviewer group. Reprinted with permission from [37].
computed scores by using ve real-world datasets – Flipkart, Bitcoin OTC, Bitcoin Alpha, Epinions and Amazon.
e current version of REV2 is deployed at Flipkart (an Indian e-commerce company).
Wang et al. [124] proposed a graph-based framework, called GGSpam to detect review spammer groups. It
recursively splits the entire reviewer graph into small groups. GSBC, the key component of GGSpam, nds the
spammer groups by identifying all the bi-connected components within the split reviewer graphs whose spamicity
score exceeds the given threshold. ey proposed several group spam indicators to compute the spamicity score
of a given reviewer group. ey conducted experiments on two real-world datasets – Amazon and Yelp.
Dhawan et al. [37] proposed DeFrauder, an unsupervised approach to detect online fraud reviewer groups.
is approach initially detects the candidate fraud groups by leveraging the underlying product review graph
and incorporating several behavioral signals which model multi-faceted collaboration among reviewers. It then
maps the reviewers into an embedding space and assigns a spam score to each group, such that groups consisting
of spammers with highly similar behavioral traits aain high spam score. ey conducted experiments on
four real-world datasets – Amazon, PlayStore, YelpNYC [94] and YelpZip [95]. Fig. 8(a) shows the schematic
diagram of DeFrauder to detect online fraud reviewer groups. Fig. 8(b) shows the coherent review paerns of
four spammers in a fraudulent reviewer group.
Liu et al. [83] formulated a novel suspiciousness metric from graph topology and spikes to detect fraudulent
users in multiple rating platforms (BookAdvocate, Amazon). e authors proposed HoloScope, an unsupervised
approach that combines suspicious signals from graph topology, temporal bursts and drops, and rating deviation.
e primary goal behind the approach is to obstruct the fraudsters by increasing the time they need to perform
an aack. e evaluation was done on multiple semi-real (synthetic) and real datasets.
Shin et al. [110] proposed two algorithms – M-Zoom (Multi-dimensional Zoom) and M-Biz (Multidimensional
Bi-directional Zoom) to detect suspicious lockstep behavior in online review platforms. e task of detecting
lockstep behavior is to nd out a set of accounts that give fake reviews to the same set of products/restaurants.
e objective of M-Zoom and M-Biz is to detect dense subtensors in a greedy way until it reaches a local optimum.
ough the overall structure of M-Biz and M-Zoom is the same, it diers signicantly in the way they nd each
dense subtensor. Using the above algorithms, the authors detected three dense subtensors that indicated the
activities of bots, which changed the same pages hundreds of thousands of times.
Mehrotra et al. [86] detected fake followers on Twier using graph centrality measures. e authors created a
graph using the follower and friend network from a set of Twier users. Next, six centrality-based features were
used for the classication experiment. Using this feature set with a Random Forest classier gave an accuracy
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of 95%. Zhang and Lu [137] proposed a graph-based approach using near-duplicates to detect fake followers in
Weibo, a Chinese counterpart of Twier. ey were able to discover 11.90 million users in Weibo who bought
followers from blackmarket services.
Shin et al. [107] detected three empirical paerns of core users in real-world networks across diverse domains.
e rst paern is the MIRROR PATTERN, which states that the coreness of a vertex is strongly related to its
degree. e second paern CORE-TRIANGLE PATTERN states that the degeneracy (non-core component) and the
triangle-count obey a power-law with slope 13. e third paern STRUCTURED CORE PATTERN states that the
degeneracy cores are not cliques. Using these paerns, the authors analyzed the lockstep behavior for collusive
followers on Twier. It was reported that at least 78% of the vertices with high coreness values use blackmarket
services to boost their followers.
Limitation. Graph-based methods are computationally intensive which can restrict their ability to design
real-time tools to detect collusive entities in online media platforms.
6.3 Deep Learning Based models
e advent of deep learning has alleviated the shortcomings of the previous models with the power to learn more
complex representations that are dicult to be captured by traditional machine learning models.
Arora et al. [8] proposed a multi-task learning approach to detect collusive tweets. e authors collected
the data from two blackmarket services - YouLikeHits and Like4Like aer creating honeypot accounts in these
services. e multi-task model takes two inputs – the feature representation extracted from the tweet metadata
and Tweet2vec representation of the tweets, which are passed through a cross-stitch neural network to learn
the optimal combination of the inputs via so parameter sharing. Ahsan et al. [3] tackled the problem of fake
reviewers using an active learning approach with the TF-IDF features of the review content.
Studies have also looked at the detection of social spammers in online media platforms. Wu et al. [127] proposed
an end-to-end deep learning model based on Graph Convolution Networks (GCNs) that operates on directed
social graphs to detect social spammers. e authors built a classier by performing graph convolution on the
social graph with dierent types of neighbors.
In a study to identify collusive entities on YouTube, Dua et al. [42] proposed CollATe, a deep unsupervised
learning method using denoising autoencoders. e CollATe architecture consists of three components – metadata
feature extractor, anomaly feature extractor, and comment feature extractor to learn video feature representations.
e nal representation is then fed to a collusive video detector module that returns the label – collusive or
non-collusive for the input video.
To detect collusive followers on Twier, Castellini et al. [23] proposed a deep learning technique using a
denoising autoencoder. e denoising autoencoder is implemented as an anomaly extractor and is trained with
examples only from the features generated from the real proles. e authors built a test set with both real
and fake proles. Once they got the reconstruction error calculated using the autoencoder for a data point, it
was then compared to a threshold value (computed from the training set): if the error is higher, it is marked as
collusive (i.e., the autoencoder is not able to properly reconstruct the record), otherwise, it is marked as real.
Limitation. e main limitation of the deep learning methods is the requirement of vast amounts of human-
annotated data. Moreover, due to the unusual behavior of collusive entities due to the mixture of organic and
inorganic activities, it is dicult to nd correlations between sets of features which makes the deep learning
techniques to not perform well.
6.4 Other Methods
In contrast to the above approaches which were largely focused on collusive activities in online media platforms,
a series of works have been conducted on detecting collusive activities in other platforms.
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Asavoae et al. [9] developed a fully automated and eective detection system to detect colluding android apps
that violate the permissions causing data leaks or distributing malware over multiple apps. e authors rst
proposed a rule-based approach to identify colluding apps. As dening rules requires expert knowledge and for
some cases explicit rules may not exist, the authors proposed a probabilistic model to calculate two likelihood
components for an app: (i) the likelihood of carrying out a threat and (ii) the likelihood of performing an inter-app
communication.
Blasco and Chen [16] proposed Application Collusion Engine (ACE), a system to automatically generate
colluding apps with a variety depending on the conguration of app component templates and code snippets.
e ACE system has two main components: colluding set engine and application engine. e rst component tells
the second component how it should create apps in order to collude. e second component is responsible for
creating fully working android apps that are ready to be installed in a device. e primary aim of this work is to
create substantial colluding app sets for experimentation as representative datasets do not presently exist for
colluding apps. Kalutarage et al. [67] proposed a probabilistic model towards an automated threat intelligence
system for app collusion. e readers are encouraged to go through [15] for a detailed survey on the app detection
techniques that focus on collusive activities by investigating inter-app communication threats.
7 ANNOTATION GUIDELINES, DATASETS, APPLICATIONS AND EVALUATION METRICS
As collusive entity detection is a considerably new research area, most of the previous studies suggested few
guidelines which may be helpful to label these users. In this section, we rst review the annotation guidelines for
creating annotated datasets for collusive entities. We then provide pointers to the previous studies which have
released various datasets for collusive entity detection. Next, we discuss the tools and interfaces in the analysis
and detection of collusive entities in online media. Finally, we describe the common evaluation metrics used for
collusive entity detection.
7.1 Annotation Guidelines
Annotation guidelines are usually seen in studies that create a labeled set of entities for various experiments, as
mentioned below.
e dataset of Dua et al. [40] is one of the most widely used dataset [7, 39] on collusive retweeter detection.
e dataset is created from the blackmarket services and the annotators were asked to label each retweeter by
one of the three classes: Bots, Promotional Customers, Normal Customers. For instance, Bots can be selected if the
account is controlled by soware. e promotional customers can be identied if the accounts are involved in
promoting brands using keywords such as ‘win’, ‘ad’, ‘Giveaway’. e normal customers class can be selected if
the account does not fall under any of the above categories. e annotators were also given complete freedom to
search for any information related to collusive entities on the web and apply their own intuition.
In [128], a corpus of collusive spammers in a Chinese review website is described. e task of the annotator is
to label each reviewer in a reviewer group as either colluder or non-colluder. e annotators in this work were
computer science major graduate students who had extensive online shopping experiences. e annotators were
given a set of three instructions about the colluder class and how they should reason to arrive at the colluder
class when the data is not straightforward: (i) if the reviewer has too many reviews giving opposite opinions
than other reviews about the same stores, (ii) if the reviewer has too many reviews giving opposite opinions
about the same stores as compared to the ratings from Beer Business Bureaus12, an organization that focuses on
advancing marketplace trust, and (iii) if the reviewer has too many reviews giving opposite opinions about the
same stores as compared to evidence by general web search results.
12hps://www.bbb.org/
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Table 2. A summary of the publicly available datasets of collusive entities in online media.
Name Available entities Type Platform Ref.
ScoRe Collusive users registered in freemium blackmarket services Individual Twier [40]
CoReRank Collusive users and tweets registered in blackmarket services Individual Twier [28]
HawkesEye Collusive retweeters promoting popular hashtags Individual Twier [41]
MTLCollu Collusive tweets registered in freemium blackmarket services Individual Twier [8]
ScoRe+ Collusive users registered in freemium/premium blackmarket services Individual Twier [39]
Fame4Sale Users involved in blackmarket-based following activities Individual Twier [33]
View WGCCA Collusive users registered in freemium blackmarket services Individual Twier [7]
MalReg Malicious retweeter groups Group Twier [55]
DetectVC Voluntary following activities Individual Sina Weibo [84]
FakeLikers Fake likers on Facebook Individual Facebook [11]
GSRank Review spammer groups Individual Amazon [90]
GSBP Loosely connected review spammer groups Individual Amazon [125]
REV2 Fraudulent users in rating platforms Individual Amazon [73]
GGSpam Review spammer groups modeled as bi-connected components Group Amazon [124]
SpEagle Spam users, fake reviews and the targeted products Individual Yelp [94]
DeFrauder Fraud reviewer groups Group PlayStore [37]
EMSCAD Online recruitment frauds Individual LinkedIn [118]
CollATe Collusive videos and channels on YouTube Individual YouTube [42]
In [89], a corpus of collusive spammers in an e-commerce website is described. ree annotators were given
the task of examining the e-commerce users and provide a label as spammer or non-spammer based on three
opinion spam signals. Note that each of the annotators was domain expert, i.e., an employee of e-commerce
platforms such as Redi Shopping, eBay.in, etc. As the annotators were domain experts, they were also given
access to detailed information, e.g., entire prole history, demographic information, etc.
Li et al. [79] built a review spam corpus. ey crawled data from a consumer review site, named Epinions13.
e task of the annotator was to annotate the review spam dataset and label each review as spam or non-spam.
e annotators used the rules specied in a platform, named Consumerist14, an independent source of consumer
news and information published by Consumer Reports, to label the reviews. e platform suggests a set of 30
rules which are helpful for annotators to spot fake online reviews. e authors employed ten college students
to annotate their reviews. Each review was annotated by two students, and conict was resolved by another
student.
In most of the above studies, Fleiss’/Cohen’s kappa value was reported to show the reliability of agreement
between the annotators.
7.2 Datasets
In this section, we present a list of publicly-available datasets used for the detection of collusive activities in
online media. Table 2 compares these datasets and lists the available entities, as mentioned in their respective
papers.
e Fame4Sale dataset [33] is a corpus of fake followers collected from various blackmarket services –
InterTwier (INT), FastFollowerz (FSF) and TwierTechnology (TWT). e dataset also contains the relationships
between the user accounts (followers/friends). e ScoRe dataset [39, 40] is a medium-sized corpus of collusive
users, collected from four freemium blackmarket retweeting services – YouLikeHits, Like4Like, Traup and
13hp://www.epinions.com/
14hps://consumerist.com/
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JustRetweet. It contains an anonymized version of 1, 941 users, who were manually annotated into four categories
(bots, promotional customers, normal customers and genuine users). e authors also reported the values of 64
features for each user, which were used in their approach to distinguish between collusive users and genuine users.
e CoReRank dataset [28] is another corpus of retweeters collected from two blackmarket services – YouLikeHits
and Like4Like. It contains the details of 4, 732 collusive users and 2, 719 genuine users. Liu et al. [84] released
the DetectVC dataset of voluntary followers containing 3, 250 volower IDs and their following relations. e
MalReg dataset [55] contains annotated groups of users that collude to retweet together maliciously. It consists
of 1, 017 malicious retweeter groups collected from three political events: UK General Election 2017, Indian
banknote demonetization 2016 and Delhi legislative assembly election 2013. e FakeLikers dataset contains
13, 147 likers, 4.66M pages, 0.99M posts and 5.47M friend relations from Facebook. ere is only one available
dataset for recruitment frauds (EMSCAD) [118]. e dataset consists of 17, 880 annotated job ads (17, 014 legitimate
and 866 fraudulent) published between 2012 and 2014 and annotated by people having domain expertise. Each
job ad is described by a set of elds, and a label indicates whether the entry is fraudulent or not. ere are a few
publicly available datasets for rating platforms. Dhawan et al. [37] released a large-scale dataset of reviews from
dierent applications available on Google Playstore. e dataset contains 3, 25, 424 reviews made by 3, 21, 436
reviews on 192 apps. YelpNYC [94] and YelpZip [95] are the datasets collected from Yelp, and used for detecting
collusive users/groups. YelpNYC dataset consists of review data related to 923 restaurants in New York City. It
includes 359k reviews and 160k reviewers. YelpZip is relatively large compared to the other two datasets. It
consists of 608k reviews and 260k reviewers, for 5k restaurants located in multiple states of the United States.
Dua et al. [42] released their dataset on collusive YouTube entities. e dataset contains a large set of YouTube
videos (45, 572 videos for like appraisals, 25, 106 videos for comment appraisals) and channels (7, 847 channels for
subscription appraisals) submied to the blackmarket services for collusive appraisals.
7.3 Interfaces and Applications
In this section, we discuss the tools and interfaces developed to detect collusion in online media. A list of
interfaces and applications is provided below with references to the corresponding studies as well. Fig. 9 shows
the working of two such applications.
(a) (b)
Fig. 9. (a) Working of TweetCred to assess credibility of content on Twier. (b) Working of Analisa to find the authenticity
of followers on Instagram.
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• Dua et al. [40] developed a chrome extension, called ScoRe to detect collusive users involved in
blackmarket-based retweeting activities. ScoRe also supports online learning by incorporating user
feedback.
• TwitterAudit15 and FollowerWonk16 services analyze Twier accounts to check for fake followers.
• Botometer17 assigns a score (0-5) to an account based on its bot activities. Higher the score, higher the
chance that the account is being controlled by a bot.
• TweetCred [53] measures the credibility of a tweet based on user-centric and tweet-centric properties.
• FakeCheck, FakeLikes and IGAudit18 evaluate Instagram accounts for fake followers.
• TwitterPatrol [111] is a real-time tool to detect spammers, fake and compromised accounts on Twier.
• Modash19 analyzes brands to nd inuencers on Instagram. It also has the functionality to detect fake
followers on a public user account.
• Analisa20 is a tool for bloggers and agencies to check the follower authenticity for an Instagram or
TikTok account.
Finally, some of the previous works have publicly released their resources and codes. Interested readers can
refer to the following studies: [7, 8, 37, 39, 40, 55] where public links to the resources and codes for collusive
entity detection and analysis are available. We believe that such studies are worthy of aention as they encourage
the reproducibility of the experiments and enable the follow-up studies to use the models as baselines to improve
the collusive entity detection models.
7.4 Evaluation Metrics
For any classication task, metrics such as precision, recall, and F-score are commonly used. However, in most of
the studies, we observe F-score to be more popular as it is a combined metric that conveys the balance between
the precision and recall. In general, F-score is calculated as the weighted harmonic mean of precision and recall,
with a beta parameter (β) which determines the weight of recall. In collusive entity detection, the most widely
used version of F-score is calculated as the macro-average of the F-scores for collusive and genuine classications
as follows:
F =
2 × precision × recall
Precision + Recall
F =
Fcollusive + Fдenuine
2
Fcollusive =
2 × Precisioncollusive × Recallcollusive
Precisioncollusive + Recallcollusive
Fдenuine =
2 × Precisionдenuine × Recallдenuine
Precisionдenuine + Recallдenuine
Precisioncollusive =
Correctcollusive
Correctcollusive + Spuriouscollusive
Precisionдenuine =
Correctдenuine
Correctдenuine + Spuriousдenuine
15hps://www.twieraudit.com
16hps://followerwonk.com/analyze
17hps://botometer.iuni.iu.edu
18hps://www.fakecheck.co, hps://fakelikes.info/, hps://igaudit.io/
19hps://www.modash.io/
20hps://analisa.io/
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Recallcollusive =
Correctcollusive
Correctcollusive +Missinдcollusive
Precisionдenuine =
Correctдenuine
Correctдenuine +Missinддenuine
where Correctcollusive and Correctдenuine indicate correctly classied collusive and genuine users, respectively.
Similarly, Spuriouscollusive (resp. Missinдcollusive ) and Spuriousдenuine (resp. Missinддenuine ) indicate false
positive (resp. false negative) for collusive and genuine classes, respectively.
Precision@k and Recall@k are another metrics used for collusive entity detection [28] and are calculated as
follows:
Precision@k = # of recommended items @k that are collusivek
Recall@k = # of recommended items @k that are collusivetotal # of collusive items .
Dua et al. [42] also reported the True Positive Rate (TPR). e reason behind choosing TPR as the evaluation
metric is because all their models are trained on one-class, and the authors are only interested in the proportion
of actual positives (data in the collusive class) that are correctly identied by the models. e evaluation strategy
can be considered when the objective is to measure the eectiveness of a single class.
8 OPEN PROBLEMS
Collusion is a considerably new topic in the area of anomaly detection which opens up a number of future research
opportunities. Some of these topics include: (i) Collective collusion detection, (ii) understanding connectivity
paerns in collusive network, (iii) event-specic studies, (iv) temporal modeling of collusive entities, (v) cross-
lingual and multi-lingual studies, (vi) core collusive user detection, (vii) cross-platform spread of collusive content,
(viii) multi-modal analysis of collusive entities, and (ix) how collusion promotes fake news. We briey discuss
these topics in detail below.
8.1 Collective Collusion Detection
Recently, collusive entity detection has gained a lot of aention in the literature. However, most of the existing
methods only detect independent collusion; but in reality, it is oen seen that the anomalous phenomena also
happens in groups. e primary aim of the collusive group detection task is to nd a set of users that jointly
exhibit anomalous behavior. Detecting anomalous groups is more dicult as compared to the individual detection
task due to the inter-group dynamics. We request the reader to read Section 5 for details of previous studies in
individual and group collusive entity detection. We believe that the advent of new datasets (see Section 7 for
more details) will foster fraudulent user/entity detection (both individual and group level) with the advantage of
adding the topical as well as the temporal dimension.
8.2 Understanding Connectivity Paerns in Collusive Network
Understanding connectivity paerns of an underlying network is a well-studied problem in the literature. It
includes tasks such as inferring lockstep behavior [14], dense block detection [109], detecting core users [107, 108],
identifying the most relevant actors in a network [17], sudden appearance/disappearance of links [46], etc. One
potential research direction is to create various networks among the entities to investigate the network’s structural
paerns. Recently, several studies have modeled information diusion for collusive entities from a topological
point of view. It includes tasks such as inuence maximization (selecting a seed set to maximize the inuence
spread) [64, 87], predicting information cascade [57, 93], measuring message propagation and social inuence
[18, 132], etc.
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8.3 Event-specific Studies
Event-specic studies can be employed by deeply investigating large-scale datasets. Some of the publicly available
datasets mentioned in Section 7 are obtained from multiple sources and span over a long period of time. erefore,
it may consist of information from many major events [10], which can be easily extracted for event-centric
studies. Researchers can also check how these users/entities were involved in manipulating the popularity of
events by articially inating/deating the social growth of entities in online media [138].
8.4 Temporal Modeling of Collusive Entities
A topic closely related to the previous topic is the temporal modeling of the collusive entities. e tasks in
temporal modeling include detecting time periods containing unusual activity[50], identifying repetitive paerns
in time-evolving graphs [134], etc. Recently, detecting anomalies in streams [45, 46] has gained a lot of araction
in the research community due to the time-evolving (or dynamic) property where consecutive snapshots of
activity in a time window are monitored. Related studies for temporal modeling can be found in [44, 126, 133].
8.5 Cross-lingual and Multi-lingual Studies
e datasets in collusive entity detection are collected from various online media platforms where the entities
usually have texts wrien in several languages. ough we observe the lack of annotated datasets in languages
other than English, cross-lingual studies can be done by converting the English texts into the target language
using automated translation tools. e converted texts can then be used to create the training and test datasets.
For multi-lingual studies, we can consider it as a future research topic that can be performed only when sucient
content is available in multiple languages.
8.6 Core Collusive User Detection
e underlying blackmarket collusive network comprising two types of users: (i) core users – fake accounts or
sockpuppets, which are fully controlled by the blackmarkets (puppet masters), and compromised accounts that are
temporarily hired to support the core users. ese two types of users are together called as collusive users. Core
users are the spine of any collusive blackmarket; they monitor and intelligently control the entire fraudulent
activities in such a way that none of their hired compromised accounts are being suspended. erefore, detecting
and removing core blackmarket users is of the utmost importance to decentralize the collusive network and keep
the YouTube ecosystem healthy and trustworthy.
According to the literature [60], detecting core nodes in a network is to nd the inuential nodes. However, in
the case of collusion, core nodes might not be inuential as these are the accounts that are fully controlled by
the blackmarket authorities. e work by Shin et al. [107] is the only study that explores empirical paerns of
core users in real-world networks. [60, 139] are some of the studies on inuential node detection in a network.
However, none of the existing studies aempted to detect core collusive users. One reason may be the lack of
ground-truth for training the model and evaluation. We believe that Core blackmarket user detection is highly
important to understand how these services operate and ag their behavior.
8.7 Cross-platform Spread of Collusive Content
Another future work could be to investigate the cross-platform spread of collusive entities and study its impact.
Online media platforms dier from each other in multiple ways: (i) dierent platforms have signicantly dierent
language characteristics, (ii) some platforms have restrictions on the length of posts allowing users to express
themselves within less space, (iii) some platforms only allow images/videos as posts, and (iv) dierent platforms
have dierent types of appraisals. Very few studies considered analyzing cross-platform data [62, 98] in online
media platforms. Moreover, no work to date examined the cross-platform study of collusive entities. An important
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related issue to conduct the cross-platform study is the need for ground-truth datasets collected from dierent
online media platforms.
8.8 Multi-modal Analysis of Collusive Entities
A recent trend in social computing research is to conduct a multi-modal analysis of online media entities. e
multi-modal investigation of collusive entities is important due to the following reasons: (i) dierent modalities
may exhibit dierent but important information about an entity (e.g., may help in detecting the authenticity of
the information), and (ii) dierent modalities can be manipulated dierently by the blackmarket services. Note
that it is expected that multi-modal analysis will introduce a computational cost due to the operation on image
and video data. Singhal et al. [112] proposed a multi-modal framework, called SpotFake for fake news detection
by leveraging the textual and image modalities. Hence, new models can be designed to incorporate dierent
modalities for collusive entity detection.
8.9 How Collusion Promotes Fake News
Online social networks are a popular way of dissemination and consumption of information. However, due to
their decentralized nature, they also come with limited liability for disinformation and collusive persuasion. It is
oen the experience that online users are subjected to a barrage of misinformation within a short span of time,
all of which are targeted at persuading the user to develop a particular sentiment against a person, a political
party, a system of medicine, or the cause of an event. is “echo chamber” eect inuences users’ thoughts in
a manner that is unfavourable to the spirit of free speech and debate. is direction may undertake research
into the detection of fake news within online social networks, with a specic focus on understanding the nature
of collusive orchestration of misinformation. In particular, one may consider – (i) collusion in fake news, i.e.,
identifying tell-tale paerns of collusion within the context of fake news, and (iii) collusive fake news detection,
i.e., leveraging such collusive paerns in order to enhance fake news detection. In addition to improving fake
news detection, this project will make fundamental advances towards a novel direction of research in fake news
analytics; that of characterizing and exploiting collusive behavior towards improving fake news detection.
9 CONCLUSION AND OPEN CHALLENGES
In this survey paper, we presented a detailed overview of the fundamentals of collusion and detection of articial
boosting of social growth and manipulation observed in online media. We categorized existing studies based on
the platforms which are compromised by the collusive users. e approaches were mostly developed for the
detection of collusive entities using techniques such as feature-based, graph-based and deep learning-based in
both supervised and unsupervised seings. In addition, the survey also includes the related annotation guidelines,
datasets, available applications, evaluation metrics and future research opportunities for collusive entity detection.
is area is still in its infancy and has various open challenges. e major challenge is the collection of
large-scale datasets, as crawling blackmarket services is extremely challenging and may require ethical consent.
Moreover, there are restrictions and limitations of the APIs provided by the online media platforms. Furthermore,
human annotation to label an action (retweet, share, like, etc.) as collusive is confusing and oen incurs low
inter-annotator agreement [28] as collusive activities bear high resemblance to genuine activities. erefore, it
is dicult to design ecient supervised methods. ere are limited studies on the detection of such collusive
manipulation in online media platforms other than social networks, which requires detailed inspection. Detection
and evaluation of self-collusion (such as creating multiple-account deception, sockpuppets, etc.) are extremely
challenging due to the diculty in collecting ground-truth data. We believe that this survey will motivate
researchers to dig deeper into exploring the dynamics of collusion in online media platforms.
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